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Abstract
This paper tests the idea that petrol prices respond more quickly to price increases than to
decreases. We show that the results previously documented in the literature for Australia are
spurious due to failure to establish the stationarity property of the price series, and the cointegration relationship between retail and wholesale prices when neglecting to account for a
regime shift in the data. Using a robust approach involving a threshold error correction model, we
find little evidence to support the contention that retail petrol price reverts asymmetrically to
long-run equilibrium. Asymmetric adjustments in retail prices are found only in four of the
twenty-eight retail gas stations in Queensland. These results cast doubt on the previously reported
pervasiveness of this asymmetric price response phenomenon in Australia. We further caution on
erroneous inference with the use of weekly rather than daily data, and when failing to account for
a regime shift in the data.
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1. Introduction
The established literature has argued that gasoline prices respond quickly to crude oil
price increases, but adjust more slowly to crude oil price decreases (Bacon, 1991; Borenstein
et al., 1997; Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003). This phenomenon has been referred to as rockets
and feathers for the reason that gasoline prices ‘shoot up like rockets’ in the face of positive
oil price shocks and ‘float down like feathers’ in response to negative shocks (Bacon, 1991).
While the rockets-and-feathers hypothesis has predominantly been examined in the U.S.
market, it has been investigated extensively in other non-US markets such as the Spanish fuel
market (Balaguer and Ripolles, 2012) and the Australian petrol market (Valadkhani, 2013),
just to name two countries by way of example.1
Importantly the Australian study differs from the Spanish one in the use of weekly data
rather than daily data. Balaguer and Ripolles (2012) highlight the importance of using daily
data on the basis that gas stations are able to adjust their prices daily, particularly given that
gas stations set their prices according to the rapidly changing conditions in the wholesale fuel
market. To that end, daily data would reveal more information about the retail price
adjustment process. From an econometric standpoint, inadequate temporal disaggregation
could result in the omission of important short time lags, which may introduce significant
bias to estimates (Geweke, 1978). An important and well established finding is that estimates
from average data per week also suffer from temporal aggregation bias (Bachmeier and
Griffin, 2003; Balaguer and Ripolles, 2012). And as we document in our study, this temporal
aggregation in weekly price series can give rise to a different stationary property compared
with daily price series. An important implication of the difference in results about the meanreversion behavior of petrol prices is that it hinders the application of the long-run
cointegration framework, which is commonly used for testing asymmetry in the retail price
adjustments when it deviates from wholesale price. Consequently, there is a need to undertake
further research that uses daily retail petrol prices in Australia.
This paper critically evaluates the model used by Valadkhani (2013) in testing the
rockets-and-feathers hypothesis for Australia’s petrol market. In addition to employing daily
1

Other country studies include Liu et al. (2010) who examine price asymmetry for diesel and petrol in New Zealand,
and Bermingham and O’Brien (2010) who test the rockets-and-feathers hypothesis in the Irish and UK petroleum
and diesel markets.
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data, which overcomes the temporal aggregation bias that has been documented in previous
studies, this paper demonstrates the importance of testing for cointegration relationship
between retail and wholesale petrol prices in the presence of a structural break, and the need
for a robust model specification which captures important features of the data when testing
for asymmetric responses of retail petrol price to wholesale price changes. To this end, we
focus our analysis on the state of Queensland (QLD), a state which exhibited significant
evidence of rockets-and-feathers behavior in retail petrol prices, apart from Tasmania (TAS)
and New South Wales (NSW) (Valadkhani, 2013). QLD also has far more retail locations
than TAS or NSW and Australian Capital Territory (ACT) combined.2 For the purpose of
exposition, the general reference to petrol is with regard to unleaded petrol.
Following the literature, Valadkhani (2013) estimates a long-run relationship between
retail and wholesale petrol prices for which the resulting residuals from that regression form
the error correction term which enters a second stage regression. Prior to running the second
regression, he tests for the stationarity property of petrol prices. However, when neglecting to
account for a structural break in the data, he erroneously concluded that the series are nonstationary when in fact they are stationary with a regime shift in both intercept and trend.
Furthermore, he tested for co-integration between retail and wholesale prices even though the
two series are I(0). Unfortunately, he also used a wrong set of critical values based on the
Augmented Dickey Fuller critical values rather than the appropriate critical values for
cointegration test. The results yield erroneous conclusion about the stationarity property of
the residuals obtained from the first stage regression. Be that as it may, Valadkhani continued
to assess evidence of asymmetry using the second stage regression. Specifically, he relied on
the feedback coefficients, which are associated with the error correction term that is proxied
by the residuals. The idea is that these feedback coefficients measure the different speeds of
adjustment when deviations from the long-run equilibrium occur. For reasons not explained
by Valadkhani (2013), he assumes that the residual (or the error correction term) follows a
Gaussian normal distribution. The assumption of normality implies a symmetric distribution
which allows him to choose two threshold levels (i.e. 0.44σ and -0.44σ) that divide the
distribution into three equal portions. Here, σ denotes the standard deviation of petrol prices.
The upper (lower) portion of the distribution is associated with the error correction (or
residual) value that is greater (lesser) than or equal to 0.44σ (-0.44σ), which he defined as
2

TAS has 8 retail locations, NSW and ACT (combined) have 30 while QLD has 28.
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EC+ (EC-). The test for asymmetry amounts to testing the null hypothesis of equality in the
coefficients of EC+ and EC- .
This study shows that the use of weekly data employed in Valadkhani (2013) fail to
justify the application of a cointegration framework given the stationary property of petrol
prices. In contrast, our results show that daily petrol prices exhibit non-stationary property
when the regression specification used for testing a unit root properly accounts for a structural
break in the data. For the 28 gas stations data examined, we find that only 15 retail prices
display a long-run relationship with wholesale prices when a structural break is accounted in
the cointegration regression. In addition, we show that the normality assumption imposed by
Valadkhani (2013) on the error correction term and the residual of the regressions, are
tenuous and that the data fail to support them. The Jarque-Bera test overwhelmingly rejects
the null of normality in the resulting regression residuals of the 15 retail prices. A plot of their
empirical distributions superimposed on a normal distribution visually suggests that the
normality assumption is untenable. Since Valadkhani fails to establish the normality of the
residual, there is a flow-on effect on the ad hoc determination of the threshold levels, which –
contrary to his assertion - fail to demarcate the distribution into three equal portions. Given
that the threshold levels are chosen incorrectly the test of the null hypothesis on the equality
of the coefficients, which are associated with the different regions of the distribution would
be erroneous.
We present a model which better captures certain empirical features of the data compared
to the one estimated by Valadkhani (2013). First, we establish that there is a long-run
equilibrium relationship between retail and wholesale prices when a structural break is taken
into consideration in the cointegration regression. Failure to accommodate a regime shift in
the cointegration relationship can result in failure to reject the false null of no cointegration
(Gregory and Hansen, 1996), which is corroborated in our findings. The resulting residual
from this cointegration regression can be used to determine whether there is asymmetric
adjustment in retail prices whenever the market is in disequilibrium. We also relax the
assumption of normality in the distribution of the residual. Given the evidence of departure
from normality in petrol prices, we use a Student’s t-distribution. As we show in the
sensitivity analyses, this assumption matters for correct inference. Secondly, there is no a
priori reason other than for convenience that the threshold levels are chosen so as to divide
the error distribution into three equal portions. It is common in the literature to employ zero
4

as the default threshold since positive and negative values can be easily associated with the
different speeds of adjustment when the deviation is above or below the long-run equilibrium
level.
Rather than fix this threshold at zero, we consider an alternative approach which allows
the data to determine the threshold level. This approach is similar to the threshold adjustment
which is developed by Enders and Siklos (2001). Their method permits asymmetry in the
speed of adjustment towards equilibrium with the threshold level purely determined by the
data. Having estimated the model, we test the null of equality in the coefficients which
measure the speed of adjustment when the discrepancies are positive and negative from the
threshold level. This forms the basis for testing the asymmetric price responses. Thirdly, the
volatility specification of retail petrol prices is permitted to respond asymmetrically to the
sign and size of the shocks. By appropriately modelling the empirical features in the data, we
show that the results fail to support the pervasiveness of rockets-and-feathers behavior in
petrol prices in the Queensland state as claimed by Valadkhani (2013). Our results provide
new and robust evidence for the lack of asymmetric retail price adjustments, which has been a
topic of significant interest by the public due to its implications for consumer welfare.3 Of the
28 retail stations examined, only four retail petrol prices are found to exhibit asymmetric
price adjustments.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature.
Section 3 discusses the data sources, explains the summary statistics of the data and
preliminary results of the cointegration test and the empirical distribution of the resulting
residuals. Section 4 presents the model, the procedure for determining the threshold and the
test for asymmetric price responses. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes the
paper with a summary of the main arguments presented here.
2. Literature Survey
2.1 What gives rise to oil price asymmetric adjustments?
Empirical observation of oil price asymmetric response to changes in wholesale prices
can be rationalized by oil companies taking advantage of their dominant market power in an
3

The social concern is based on studies documenting that oil companies have a propensity to take advantage of oil
price variations in the international market. Their aim is to increase revenues by failing to adjust retail prices in
accordance with movements of the wholesale prices. Consequently, consumers are expected to pay higher prices
which reduce their welfare. (Galeotti et al., 2003; Contin Pilart and Correljé, 2009; Balaguer and Ripolles, 2012).
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oligopolistic industry (Contín-Pilart and Correljé, 2009). The extent of price asymmetry
depends on the number of competitors in the market; fewer competitors are associated with
more price asymmetry. Oligopolistic markets exist due to high barriers to entry. Some
barriers include the requirement for government licensing and large economies of scale that
exist in the fuel market. Collusive behavior is thought to be a common practice in the
oligopolistic fuel market where prices are set unfairly higher for consumers. Borenstein et al.
(1997) show that tacit collusion is practised by firms in which they use past prices as a focal
point to exploit market power. Tacit collusive behavior is an undeclared agreement, where
collusion occurs either through excessive advertising or when a market leader sets a
benchmark price for competitors to follow. In the event that wholesale prices increase, each
retailer is quick to raise prices to signal to their competitors that they are following a tacit
agreement. When upstream prices decline, firms are slow to adjust prices since they run the
risk of signaling to competitors that they no longer follow a tacit agreement (Galeotti et al.,
2002). As a result of collusion, this may lead to delayed price reductions but not price
increases.
Another possible explanation for oil price asymmetric adjustments is the break down in
collusions amongst retail gas stations. Once retailers adopt a trigger strategy (resulting in
temporary increase in market share for a particular firm), the slow gradual decline in retail
price will soon lead to a rapid fall in prices to their competitive levels as firms compete for
market share. If market power is indeed present and firms temporary practise this asymmetric
pricing behavior, the situation is unlikely to last because firms are faced with consumer
search costs in search for cheaper prices (Brown and Yücel 2000). As petrol prices change
frequently, it is difficult for consumers to maintain accurate price information (Lewis 2011).
Lewis (2011) has developed a reference point search model to illustrate that the amount of
effort consumers spend on searching depends on their expectations of what prices should be,
which are prices in the previous period. When wholesale prices increase, retailers act to
maintain their profits by passing on the increase to consumers who notice that prices are
higher than their reference point (i.e. the last period price). Consumers then begin to search
for cheaper petrol prices that are in line with their expectations. Increased search effort leads
to changes in the price elasticity of demand faced by firms, leading to smaller profit margins
at each station, thus forcing prices to fall to their competitive levels. Alternatively, when
retail prices begin to decline as a result of falling wholesale prices, consumers will search less
6

because the price is either equal to or less than their reference point. Hence, the natural
tendency is that consumers are willing to pay the first price they notice and do not search as
much. This leads to a slower reduction in retail price which makes the market less
competitive and firms experience higher margins in the short-term (Brewer et al., 2014).
According to Brown and Yücel (2000), beyond market power and search costs, there are
other explanations for the asymmetric price response of petroleum. Consumer responses to
changes in petrol price can contribute to asymmetric price responses. Suppose there is a
sudden depletion of crude oil or the Australian exchange rate is expected to depreciate (which
was the case during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008), consumer demand for petrol would
accelerate and induce further increases in rising prices. Retailers would experience temporary
shortages in current inventories and be forced to increase prices rapidly to account for excess
demand. As Brown and Yücel (2000) explained, firms may face adjustment costs, if oil
supply is reduced; wholesalers have little choice but to reduce output quickly, which would
lead to a rapid increase in retail prices. On the contrary, when crude oil supplies are increased,
suppliers would not have to increase output quickly. They could delay price reduction by
controlling the outflow of petroleum products, which could lead to delays in price reduction.
2.2 Empirical evidence of oil price asymmetric adjustments
Empirical results on petrol price asymmetry are mixed. Past studies have differed in terms
of the variables examined, sample period used, the frequency of the data, estimation
techniques employed and the country under scrutiny. The lack of a unifying framework for
testing and examining petrol price asymmetry has led to the ongoing debate and development
of novel modelling and testing approach in the literature. The pioneering work on analyzing
price asymmetry is the study by Bacon (1991), which examines the United Kingdom’s fuel
market using data from 1982 to 1989. Bacon discovers that retail prices appeared to rise faster
to increases in the price of crude oil compared to when prices decline. Bacon (1991) was the
first to coin the term “rockets and feathers” where prices rise like “rockets” and fall like
“feathers” when changes occurred to the upstream supply of petrol.
In another influential paper by Borenstein et al. (1997) who extensively study the
distribution process for fuel in the United States, the authors analyze price transmission at
different points in the distribution, such as crude oil-retail and wholesale-retail margins. They
find an asymmetric relationship exists between wholesale and retail margins. In particular,
7

they find that crude oil retail asymmetry prices depend on a number of factors like the
transporters, wholesale margins, and exchange rates, amongst others.
In a related study, Radchenko (2005) examines the link between oil price volatility and
asymmetry responses of gasoline prices to oil prices increases and decreases in the United
States. He finds that the degree of asymmetry in gasoline prices declines with an increase in
oil price volatility, which is consistent with the prediction offered by the oligopolistic
coordination theory. Brewer et al. (2014) argue that many retailers prefer volatility in
upstream prices. Specifically, when firms experience low profits at times of increasing
wholesale costs, price cycles with higher price volatility had economically significant benefits
especially when prices decline as retailers are able to make large short-term profits.
For a state-specific study, Verlinda (2008) explores asymmetrical relationships in petrol
prices in the state of California. The influence of geographical and product differentiation has
shown that petrol prices rise faster for wholesale price increases than they fall for decreases in
cost. It is found that local-market differentiation is associated with higher asymmetry than
those without differing characteristics (brand of product), which would lead to potential
market power. The results suggest that differentiated products offered to consumers wielded
an influence on the degree of price asymmetry.
Not all empirical studies which test the rockets-and-feathers phenomenon support this
hypothesis. An early study conducted by Karrenbrock (1991) provides an example for the
effects of wholesale price changes onto retailers using a distributed lag model. Karrenbrock
finds that the lag effects are symmetric for leaded petrol using monthly data. Bachmeier and
Griffin (2003) extend the work of Borenstein et al. (1997) by using both weekly and daily
data for the U.S. market. The authors find evidence of asymmetry for the weekly series
between crude oil and wholesale price deviations, however, when employing daily data,
Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) find no evidence of asymmetry for the margins.
More recently, Bermingham and O’Brien (2010) have empirically tested whether the Irish
and UK petroleum and diesel markets are subjected to asymmetric pricing. Employing a
Threshold Autoregressive model (TAR) with monthly data, they find evidence to support the
rockets-and-feathers hypothesis. On the other hand, Liu et al. (2010) examine the diesel and
petrol industry in New Zealand, and they fail to find any evidence of price asymmetry
between crude oil and wholesale prices for petroleum. Nevertheless, there is statistical
8

evidence of diesel prices responding asymmetrically to price increases and decreases. They
rationalized that diesel prices are not as competitive as petrol because they are mainly used in
the business sector of New Zealand, and to that end oil companies take advantage of the
relatively inelastic demand for diesel by users.
A survey of the literature on asymmetric fuel price responses to price increases or
decreases is extensive and it is not possible to include all of them in this section. Nonetheless,
our survey of the literature highlights a number of critical issues that need to be addressed
when assessing the rockets-and-feathers hypothesis. Fundamentally, the econometric model
needs to be sufficiently flexible to capture empirical features of the data. Alongside the
model, equally important is the data frequency that is employed to empirically test the
hypothesis. It appears that the use of a disaggregated dataset (i.e. daily) is preferred by many
researchers since it captures better variation in oil price movements (Polemis and Fotis,
2013). However, in many cases daily data can be difficult to obtain due to data unavailability.
In this paper, we take issue with these two fundamental issues of data frequency and model
specification to demonstrate that they matter for the assessment of the rockets-and-feathers
hypothesis.
3. Data and Summary Statistics
3.1 The Data
The dataset is purchased from Fueltrac (www.fueltrac.com.au) and specifically focuses on
the state of Queensland, Australia for the period from 29 October 2007 to 30 April 2014,
which comprises 2377 daily observations.4 Daily data are obtained given that retailers are
able to adjust their prices daily. Additionally, using a more disaggregated data like daily data
would permit a closer examination of the price variation and reveal information about the
behavior of retailers, which would otherwise be masked when using weekly or monthly data
as is commonly reported in most studies. In total there are 28 retail and 5 wholesale locations
in the Queensland dataset.
There are two prices of interest, namely retail prices and terminal gate prices (TGP) or
wholesale prices. Terminal gate prices (TGP) are the spot prices where fuel can be purchased
by retailers located close to the wholesale distributor. Petroleum either comes from domestic
4

The source of the dataset is similar to the one used by Valadkhani (2013). However, Valadkhani employs weekly
data and for a shorter period from 29 October 2007 to 30 January 2012.
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refineries or is imported from international port terminals. There are two price benchmarks
that are important in determining the terminal gate prices (TGP). They are the import parity
prices (IPP) and wholesale prices (ACCC Monitoring of the Australian Petroleum Industry
2014, p.61). The IPP is the cost of importing refined petrol where this index is used as a
margin for determining domestic wholesale prices. The IPP plays a central role in
determining prices where movements in this index can have a major influence on the
downstream supply chain. Given that Singapore is the major source of imported fuel which
makes up approximately 40% of the Australian market, Singapore’s wholesale prices are
closely followed as a benchmark to determine domestic prices. In sum, terminal gate prices
can be decomposed into the following constituents:

-Figure 1 about hereIn Australia, except for Western Australia, retailers are free to adjust prices on a daily
basis. Changes to daily retail prices are influenced by international prices for fuel, the
Australian exchange rate, taxes and variations in wholesale and retail margins. Dispersions in
retail prices can vary substantially between regional and metropolitan areas. Retailers who
operate further away from their wholesale distributors such as regional retailers are on
average expected to offer a higher pump price in comparison to city retailers. One reason for
this is that regional retail stations only experience fuel deliveries every two to three weeks in
comparison to city stations, which usually take delivery every week since retailers operating
in metropolitan areas experience a higher quantity demand for petroleum than those in
regional areas. Furthermore, distance travelled by delivery trucks also has an influence on the
retail cost margins when determining the daily pump price. Generally, the further away a
service station operates from its nearest wholesale distributor the higher are the freight costs
which are transferred onto the final price. Changes in the production and wholesale margins
for petrol tend to have the highest influence on the price offered by retailers. In summary, it
can be seen in Figure 1 that the average national price of petrol for 2012-2013 is made up of
the refined production cost accounting for 56% of retail price, followed by government taxes
which account for 36% of retail price. The remainder consists of wholesale and retail cost
margin.
-Figures 2 and 3 about here10

Evidence of daily seasonality is present in the data and hence a seven-day moving average
is applied to remove the influence of seasonal patterns. Plots of the movement of retail and
wholesale prices are depicted in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. Figure 2 shows the retail prices
in Queensland from 28 retailers. The colored lines represent the prices offered by retailers
across the state. It can be seen that at any point in time, the variation in petrol price offered by
retailers is substantive. These price differences can be attributed to retailers’ geographical or
location differences. In contrast, the 5 terminal gate prices illustrated in Figure 3 show no
signs of large price dispersions from each other. This is not surprising given that the majority
of the wholesale distributors operate close to the shoreline. Figure 4 shows a map of
Queensland in which the retail locations denoted by green triangles were matched with their
closest wholesale supplier and distributors marked by red diamonds, namely Brisbane,
Cairns, Gladstone, Mackay and Townsville. It is evident that all wholesale suppliers are
located along the shoreline. The graphs for retail and terminal gate prices show that these
prices are somewhat moving in tandem suggesting that a cointegration relationship could
exist between them. Furthermore, there is a large fall in petrol prices around about 2008,
which may suggest the presence of a structural break that would need to be accounted for
when undertaking both the unit root and cointegration tests.
-Figure 4 about here3.2 Data Summary Statistics
Tables 1 presents the summary statistics for retail and wholesale locations, respectively,
from 4/11/2007 to 30/4/2014. Based on the average retail prices, five of the most expensive
locations are Cloncurry ($1.55), Charleville ($1.48), Cunnamulla ($1.48) Longreach ($1.47),
and Mt. Isa ($1.45). On the other hand, the least expensive retail locations were Brisbane
($1.36), Caloundra ($1.36), Ipswich ($1.36), Toowoomba ($1.33) and Warwick ($1.36).
These price differences should not come as a surprise since retailers that offer higher prices
tend to be located in regional Queensland compared to cheaper locations operating closer to
their nearest wholesale distributors. Differences in the average price offered by petrol stations
can also be a result of different economies of scale arising from population density, travel
distance and competition.
-Tables 1 about here-
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The kurtosis for the distribution of petrol prices in 28 locations is less than zero,
suggesting that the distribution is broader, flatter, and has thinner tails than a Gaussian normal
distribution. Many of the statistics are statistically different from zero, which is the value of
the kurtosis for a normal distribution. Moreover, all of the distributions are negatively skewed
implying that the distribution is non-symmetric. Given the evidence of skewness and nonnormal kurtosis, the Jarque Bera test statistic for the null of normal distribution is
comfortably rejected at the 1% level of significance for all retail and wholesale prices in all
locations.
We also undertake unit root test and cointegration tests with and without structural breaks.
Results of the unit root Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test without structural breaks are not
reported here for brevity, but they are available from the authors upon request. To
endogenously determine the break when testing for stationarity, we use the Zivot and
Andrews (1992) test (ZA test, henceforth). Table 2 shows the results of the ZA test and as
anticipated allowing structural breaks in the intercept gives rise to a break that coincides with
the suspected break in September 2008. However, in all cases, we fail to reject the unit-root in
favor of stationarity with one break for wholesale and retail prices in all locations.
-Tables 2 and 3 about hereSince both retail and wholesale prices are non-stationary, and the fact that both price
series are seen to move together closely (see Figures 1 and 2), we test for a cointegration
long-run relationship by accommodating a structural break. The test for cointegration is
performed between a retail price and its closest wholesale price using both the Engle and
Granger (1987) (EG, henceforth) procedure and the Gregory and Hansen (1996a) (GH,
henceforth) procedure, which accommodates a structural break. The shift in intercept, the
trend term and the slope coefficient are permitted in the model specification with a structural
break. For an exposition of the cointegration regression with a structural break in practice, the
reader is referred to Gregory and Hansen (1996b). Table 3 reports the results for the
cointegration analysis among the pair of retail and wholesale prices for both EG and GH
procedures. Gregory and Hansen (1996b) utilize the method of Mackinnon (1991) to calculate
the approximate asymptotic critical values for regime shift in the cointegration relationship.
Appropriate lags were chosen for the specification based on minimizing the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC). The EG test statistic rejects the null hypothesis of no
12

cointegration in 5 of the 28 locations (i.e. Brisbane, Caboolture, Caloundra, Gold Coast and
Ipswich) in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the series are cointegrated. For the GH test
statistic, only 15 of the 28 locations show evidence of cointegration between the retail and
wholesale prices. Given that cointegration exists only in these 15 retail locations, our
empirical assessment of the rockets-and-feathers hypothesis is restricted to these retail prices.
Although the precise timing of the breaks varies, the breaks are identified to occur around
mid-2008, which coincides with the global recession.5 These results also demonstrate that
failing to account for a structural break can lead to over-rejection of the null of no
cointegration, leading to spurious findings of cointegration between retail and wholesale
petrol prices.
-Table 4 about hereAt this point it is worth comparing our results with that of Valadkhani (2013). In his
study, Valadkhani started his analysis on the premise that the retail price and wholesale price
series are cointegrated, and he tested for evidence of cointegration by performing a unit root
test on the resulting residuals from the regression. A drawback in his approach lies with the
use of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) critical values to test the null hypothesis that the
residuals are non-stationary (i.e. there is no cointegration between retail and wholesale
prices). 6 The ADF critical values are not valid given that the residuals are themselves
estimates. Appropriate critical values would need to be obtained from simulation. Engle and
Granger (1987) report the critical values under the null that the residuals are non-stationary.
Mackinnon (1991) provide the approximate asymptotic critical values for the Engle and
Granger (1987) test using a procedure which involves fitting a response surface. Table 4
reports the results of the cointegration test done by Valadkhani using weekly prices.
It is apparent from these results which are based on the Dickey-Fuller critical values,
sixteen retail prices are cointegrated with the terminal gate prices at conventional levels of
significance. However, when the correct critical values are used, only two retail prices are
shown to be cointegrated with the terminal gate prices at the 10% significance level. One
implication of Valadkhani’s results is that if the residuals are shown to be non-stationary as
5

The global financial recession caused demand for energy to shrink in late 2008, with oil prices collapsing from the
July 2008 high of $147 to a December 2008 low of $32.
6
The ADF critical values for the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level are -3.46, -2.88 and -2.57, respectively (see
Table 3 of Valadkhani (2013)). These are simulated critical values obtained for a sample size of 250 observations for
a regression that includes a constant but no trend.
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evidenced by the use of the appropriate critical values, then it makes little sense to include the
residuals from the cointegration regression in the second stage regression. In particular, given
that the regression is spurious, inference about the asymmetric adjustment in retail prices
when there are disequilibria in the market is in doubt. Clearly, a re-assessment of the rocketsand-feathers hypothesis in the Queensland state is warranted. Further, Valadkhani (2013) fail
to perform a cointegration test with structural break(s), implying that his cointegration test
results may be biased not only by the use of wrong critical values but also as a result of model
misspecification.
4. The Empirical Model
Having established the presence of a cointegration relationship between the price of
unleaded petrol prices and its cost, we estimate the following regression:
(1)

where (

) is the retail price and (

) is the wholesale prices at time t at the ith location for

i=1,…,5, and jth location for j=1,..,28. The time trend variable

captures the average

increases in related costs associated with the distribution of petrol like transport, insurance
and storage (Bacon, 1991). The intercept denotes the level of existing costs for a particular
location j. Here,

is a dummy variable which equals one from the date when a structural

break occurs to the end of the sample period and zero for the period prior to the break. The
unobserved error term (e ) represents the exogenous shocks in the model, which displays the
deviations from the long run equilibrium. Moreover, this residual term is essential for
analyzing the presence of asymmetric adjustment when there are petrol price increases and
decreases which cause retail price to deviate from the wholesale price. Both retail and
wholesale prices are expressed in Australian cents per litre. For brevity, we do not report the
regression results but they are available from the author upon request.
The short-run dynamic which takes into account possible asymmetric price adjustments
can be determined by estimating the following Threshold Error Correction (TEC) model. The
second stage regression is:
∆

∆

∆

.
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2

Here, ∆

measures the first difference of the j-th retail location price. The first difference of

terminal gate prices are given by ∆

. To ensure that the residual

serial correlation, we fit an ARMA(k,q) model. The

is purged of any

measures the error correction

term which is given by the one period lagged valued of the residuals obtained in regression
(1) for the j-th retail location. The threshold value which is determined by the data is denoted
by

for the j-th retail location. The notation

(

) which appears as a superscript in the

error correction term denotes the value of the residuals which is larger than or equal to (lower
than) the threshold value. The coefficients of interest which capture the asymmetric price
adjustment to price increases and decreases are
of

and

, respectively. In general, the value

is unknown and needs to be estimated along with the values of

and

the literature on testing for asymmetric price adjustment, it seems natural to set

. However, in
0 so that

the cointegrating vector coincides with the attractor. In such circumstances, the adjustment is
if the lagged residual value is above the long-run equilibrium and

if the

lagged residual value is below the long-run equilibrium. Failure to reject the null of equality
in the magnitude of these two point estimates (i.e.

) would imply that there is no

asymmetric price adjustment in petrol prices.
While setting

0 may seem a natural and convenient approach when testing for price

asymmetry, there is no a priori reason to expect the threshold to coincide with the attractor.
When estimating the unknown

, Chan (1993) demonstrated that searching over the potential

threshold values so as to minimize the sum of squared errors from the fitted model yields a
superconsistent estimate of the threshold. To employ Chan’s methodology, the estimated
residual series resulting from regression (1) was sorted in ascending order such that e
e

⋯

e where T denotes the number of usable observations. The largest and smallest

15% of the {e } values were discarded and each of the remaining 70% of the values were
considered possible thresholds. For each of these possible thresholds, we estimated an
equation in the form of (2). The estimated threshold yielding the lowest residual sum of
squares was deemed to be the appropriate estimate of the threshold. Inference concerning the
individual values of

and

value of the threshold

is unknown. The property of asymptotic multivariate normality has

, and the restrictions

is problematic when the true

not been established for this case. In discussing the difficulty of establishing the distribution
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of the parameter estimates, Chang and Tong (1989) conjectured that utilizing a consistent
estimate should establish the asymptotic normality of the coefficients.
Note that our approach differs from Valadkhani (2013) in two important ways. Firstly, we
do not make any assumption about the normality in the residuals. In fact, we assume that
follows a Student’s t distribution. Secondly, the thresholds are not pre-determined by dividing
the distribution into three different regions, which are separated by -0.44σj and 0.44σj. As we
have documented in the data and summary statistics section, these pre-determined threshold
values do not divide the distribution into three equal portions since the distribution departs
from normality and there is evidence of skewness and kurtosis in the distribution.
Thirdly and finally, it is possible that the price series may exhibit autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) effects (Balaguer and Ripolles, 2012). We model the
conditional variance of

in equation (2) as a generalized autoregressive conditional

heteroscedasticity (GARCH (1,1)) model:
(3)
To accommodate the potential larger impact of negative shocks on return conditional
variance, which is usually termed the asymmetric leverage volatility effect, we also estimate
the GJR model developed by Glosten et al. (1993):
0
where

(4)

0 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the shock is negative and

zero otherwise. Here, a negative unit shock elicits a larger response in the conditional
variance by

compared to only

for a positive unit shock. Wei et al. (2010)

demonstrate that oil price volatility displays asymmetric volatility.
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Empirical features of the cointegration regression residuals
Figure 5 depicts the plot of the residuals obtained from the cointegration regression. A
cursory look at this plot suggests that the empirical distributions of these residuals are not
normal. For this reason, the assumption made by Valadkhani (2013) that -0.44σj and 0.44σj
would divide the distribution equally into three portions is in doubt. Equally, the different
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underlying empirical distribution of the residuals would suggest that the threshold value
would differ from one retail station to the next. For this reason, it is important to estimate
the threshold value from the data.
-Figure 5 and Table 5 about hereTable 5 reports the summary statistics of the residuals from the cointegration regression.
It can be seen that by and large the residuals are negatively skewed and the kurtosis ranges
from 2 to 4. More importantly, the Jarque-Bera test overwhelmingly rejects the null of
normality in all cases thus confirming our suspicion about the departure from normality in the
regression residuals as shown in Figure 5. An important implication of these results is that the
approach taken by Valadkhani (2013) who assumes that the residuals are normally distributed
and the use of an ad hoc approach to divide the supposed normal distribution into three equal
portions, cannot be justified.
5.2 How prevalent is the asymmetric response in petrol prices in Queensland?
Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates of the threshold error correction model given by
equation (2). The estimate for

denotes the adjustment coefficient when the difference

between the retail price and the wholesale price is larger than or equal to
estimate for

, while the

denotes the adjustment coefficient when the difference between the retail

price and the wholesale price is smaller than

. By and large these values are statistically

significant and different from zero, except in some instances such as Cairns and Charter
Towers for

and Cairns for

for which they are not statistically different from zero.

Another interesting observation is that the magnitude of the |

| tends to be larger than |

|

in 8 out of 15 cases, which implies that the speed of adjustment is more rapid for positive
than for negative discrepancies from ̂ . When we test the null hypothesis that
the eight cases where we found |

|>|

, of

|, only in six retail stations, namely Brisbane metro,

Bundaberg, Caboolture, Caloundra, Gold Coast, and Ipswich do we reject the null at the 5%
significance level. Taken together, the results suggest that in these six retail stations we fail to
find support for the assertion that petrol prices fall more slowly during price increases and
increase faster during price decreases. With respect to the other two retail stations which
were found to exhibit |

|>|

|, the test for the null hypothesis of
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does not find

support that there are statistically significant differences in the speed of adjustments for
positive and negative discrepancies from ̂ .
Finally, referring to the other seven retail stations which display |
price adjustments, the test for the null hypothesis of

|<|

| in the petrol

is rejected for Dalby, Hervey

Bay, Toowoomba and Warwick.7 In other words, for the state of Queensland we find that the
evidence for asymmetric response of retail prices in the rate of adjustment toward long-run
equilibrium is less prevalent than was previously reported by Valadkhani (2013). Of the 28
stations examined in this study, only 4 retail stations present evidence of asymmetric price
responses to petrol price increases and decreases.
-Table 6 about hereThe threshold estimate

varies significantly from station to station. To ensure that these

threshold levels are comparable, we standardize them by dividing the threshold estimate with
its standard deviation. The standardized threshold is denoted by

∗

. It can be seen from these

estimates that the assumption of a zero threshold is untenable except in the case of Gladstone
which indicates that

∗

0.0075. The value of

∗

tends to be different from 0 and it varies

from -1.01 in Dalby to 1.18 in North Coast.
The degree of freedom estimate,

, also varies substantially with the highest value

registering for Gladstone (5.182) and the lowest for Brisbane metro, Caloundra and Gold
Coast (2.000). This parameter estimate is statistically significant in all cases implying that the
assumption of a Student’s t distribution is well supported by the data. The low estimate of
with most estimates reporting a value of around 2 implies that the distribution has a lower
peak than a normal distribution otherwise would have. In the next subsection we describe the
implication of adopting a normal distribution on inference about the asymmetric price
adjustments.
There is no pervasive evidence of asymmetric volatility in petrol price returns. Referring
to the coefficient estimate of

, the only case when

estimate is statistically significant at

the 1% and 5% level is for Hervey Bay and Cairns, respectively. Petrol price return volatility

7

Although Charter Towers rejects the null hypothesis of
, the value of
is not different from zero
implying that when there is positive discrepancies from ̂ there is no adjustment towards long-run equilibrium.
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documents asymmetry at the 10% level for Caloundra and Toowoomba. This would imply
that a GARCH(1,1) model may be adequate in modelling return volatility for most of the
other retailer petrol prices.
5.3 Sensitivity analyses
(a) Weekly data
To determine the degree by which our results would differ with the use of weekly data,
we calculate the weekly average of the daily data. Preliminary analysis of the series using the
Zivot-Andrews test suggests that there exists a structural break around about October or
November of 2008. And when this regime shift is accounted for in the intercept and trend of
the regression, the resulting test statistic overwhelmingly rejects the null of stationarity in
favour of a stationary series with a regime shift. Table 7 shows the results of the ZivotAndrews test which support this conclusion. One important implication of these results is that
we cannot proceed to test for asymmetric adjustments in retail petrol prices using the long-run
cointegration framework. More importantly, our results for Queensland point to possible
erroneous inference which Valadkhani (2013) obtained by using standard unit root tests
which fail to account for a structural break. In fact, a cursory look at the data plots for both
unleaded petrol prices and terminal gate prices (see Figure 3 and 4, respectively on pp.73 of
Valadkahni, 2013) show that there is a visible structural break around about October and
November of 2008. These results cast doubt on the evidence of asymmetric petrol price
adjustments reported in Valadkhani (2013) study.
-Table 7 about here(b) The assumption of a Normal distribution
We estimate the threshold error correction model with the assumption of a Gaussian
normal distribution and symmetric volatility. The results which are reported in Table 8 Panel
A suggest that there is no evidence of asymmetric price adjustment toward long-run
equilibrium that is consistent with the rockets-and-feathers hypothesis. Although we observe
that the estimate of

is smaller in magnitude than

and Townsville, and that the null hypothesis of
noteworthy that the parameter estimates

for the case of Bundaberg, Gladstone
is rejected in all the three cases, it is

and

are not statistically significant and

different from zero in some instances. The contrast in results compared with the model which
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assumes a Student’s t distribution is stark, but more importantly, they suggest that failing to
specify an appropriate underlying distribution of the data generating process can lead to
erroneous inference.
-Table 8 about here(c) Daily data and neglecting a regime shift in the cointegration regression
An important consideration in our evaluation of the asymmetric adjustment in retail petrol
price towards the wholesale price is the presence of a structural break in the cointegration
relationship. We undertake the empirical analysis by deliberately failing to account for a
regime shift in the cointegration relationship between petrol retail and wholesale prices. For
brevity, we report the estimation results of the threshold error correction model which pertain
to the coefficients

and

, and the results for the test for the null hypothesis

(see Table 8, Panel B). It can be seen that there are only two instances when |
that is for Hervey Bay and Toowoomba. However, the null hypothesis

|

|

|,

is rejected at

the 5% significance level only for Toowoomba. Taken together, the results underreport the
number of cases which exhibits asymmetric adjustment in petrol prices. Our results suggest
the importance of correctly identifying the presence of structural breaks in the data when
undertaking an evaluation of the asymmetric price adjustment in petrol prices.
6. Conclusion
The empirical study conducted in this paper is motivated by concerns over the negative
effect on consumer welfare when petrol prices remain high despite falling wholesale prices.
The pervasiveness of the rockets-and-feathers phenomenon in Australia was brought to light
by Valadkhani (2013) who finds that more than a third of the retail gas stations in Queensland
exhibit asymmetric price revision towards long run equilibrium when there are market
disequilibria. We revisit the empirical framework he employed to determine his findings. We
take issue with a number of untenable assumptions and the failure to establish a cointegration
relationship between retail petrol price and the wholesale price while accommodating a
regime shift in that relationship, which lead to the finding of a disproportionately large
percentage of retail gas stations displaying the rockets-and-feathers phenomenon.
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Our contributions lie in developing a robust and at the same time more general model
which demonstrates that the asymmetric price revision does not have to be governed by a
threshold level that is set to zero. In fact, our estimation results indicate that the threshold
level which underpins the difference in the price revision arising from positive and negative
discrepancies from the threshold level is different from zero. Through a more general and
robust characterization of the behavior of petrol prices which allows for a structural break,
our results suggest that daily petrol prices adjust asymmetrically to terminal gate price
changes only in 4 of the 28 retail gas stations. It is therefore implied that the rockets-andfeathers phenomenon in Queensland is not as pervasive as previously reported. Our results
also caution on possible biases in inference when failing to appropriately account for certain
empirical features of the data such as neglecting a structural break in the unit root test and the
cointegration specification, misspecification of the underlying distribution and using weekly
data which are subjected to temporal aggregation bias.
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Figure 1 National Average of Retail Price in Australia

Retail Price Components:
National Average 2012‐2013 (141 cents per litre)

Wholesale&Retail cost Margin
Government Taxes
Refined Production Cost

Source: Australian Institute of Petroleum National Average 2012
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Figure 4 Map of Queensland with Wholesale Distributors and Retail Locations

Note: The red diamonds denote the approximate locations of the wholesale distributors while the green triangles denote the location of the cities or towns
associated with various petrol retailers.
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Figure 5 Empirical Distribution of the Cointegration Regression Residuals

Note: The solid line which is superimposed on the histogram is the normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation that corresponds to the
standard deviation of the residuals.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for 5 Wholesale Prices and 28 Retail Prices
Wholesale
Mean
Location
(cents per
Standard dev Skewness
Kurtosis
litre)
Brisbane
Cairns
Gladstone
Mackay
Townsville

129.71
132.48
132.38
132.99
132.33

Retail
Location

Mean
(cents per
litre)
136.96
138.36
137.40
139.86
136.43
148.23
141.75
155.04
148.08
137.10
140.66
139.51
137.17
140.10
137.58
138.28
136.85
138.18
147.27
138.04
137.75
145.28
137.36
141.51
142.14
133.93
137.33
136.60

Brisbane
Bundaberg
Caboolture
Cairns
Caloundra
Charleville
Charters
Towers
Cloncurry
Cunnamulla
Dalby
Emerald
Gladstone
Gold Coast
Goondiwindi
Gympie
Hervey Bay
Ipswich
Kingaroy
Longreach
Maryborough
Mackay
Mt. Isa
North Coast
Rockhampton
Roma
Toowoomba
Townsville
Warwick

JarqueBera

12.44
12.56
12.50
12.66
12.58

-0.33***
-0.34***
-0.33***
-0.35***
-0.36***

-0.45
-0.49***
-0.48***
-0.53***
-0.48***

62.99***
70.61***
66.72***
74.90***
74.42***

Standard dev

Skewness

Kurtosis

JarqueBera

13.64
13.60
13.82
14.77
13.55
11.89
13.23

-0.56***
-0.48***
-0.54***
-0.65***
-0.56***
-0.56***
-0.80***

-0.14
-0.72***
-0.21**
-0.29***
-0.11
-0.22**
-0.07

128.21***
144.97***
121.02***
174.64***
122.91***
130.47***
253.46***

15.12
13.90
15.63
14.12
13.27
13.29
14.66
13.85
13.10
13.32
14.03
14.34
13.01
14.45
14.08
13.15
13.62
13.50
14.51
14.56
13.64

-0.68***
-0.65***
-0.50***
-0.75***
-0.55***
-0.57***
-0.71***
-0.73***
-0.64***
-0.61***
-0.62***
-0.61***
-0.60***
-0.69***
-0.57***
-0.67***
-0.71***
-0.93***
-0.67***
-0.74***
-0.82***

-0.40***
-0.57***
-0.52***
-0.27***
-0.13
-0.07
-0.43***
-0.15
-0.23**
-0.07
-0.28
-0.43***
-0.31***
-0.22**
-0.58***
-0.13
-0.09
0.44***
-0.32***
-0.03
0.17*

197.49***
198.64***
124.92***
227.51***
121.65***
128.41***
217.01***
214.88***
167.34***
145.27***
158.38***
159.18***
153.71***
193.88***
163.54***
177.51***
198.20***
361.77***
185.17***
218.29***
270.95***

Note: *, ** and *** indicate that the null hypothesis that the skewness and kurtosis are equal to zero is rejected at the
10%, 5% and 1% significance level. For the Jarque Bera test, the null hypothesis is that the price series is normally
distributed.
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Table 2 Zivot-Andrews Test Results for Daily Data
Wholesale
Locations
Brisbane
Cairns
Gladstone
Mackay
Townsville
Retail Locations
Brisbane
Bundaberg
Caboolture
Cairns
Caloundra
Charleville
Charters Towers
Cloncurry
Cunnamulla
Dalby
Emerald
Gladstone
Gold Coast
Goondiwindi
Gympie
Hervey Bay
Ipswich
Kingaroy
Longreach
Maryborough
Mackay
Mt Isa
North Coast
Rockhampton
Roma
Toowoomba
Townsville
Warwick

Break date

Test Statistic

k (lags)

2008:09:11
2008:09:13
2008:09:13
2008:09:13
2008:09:13

-2.31
-2.29
-2.28
-2.34
-2.31

4
4
4
4
4

2008:09:13
2008:09:30
2008:09:15
2008:09:16
2008:09:05
2008:09:26
2008:09:22
2008:10:01
2008:09:27
2008:09:22
2008:09:24
2008:09:29
2008:09:12
2008:10:01
2008:09:03
2008:09:18
2008:09:15
2008:09:30
2008:09:19
2008:09:08
2008:10:05
2008:09:06
2008:08:30
2008:09:30
2008:09:23
2008:09:26
2008:09:23
2008:09:03

-2.46
-2.52
-2.65
-2.91
-2.99
-1.72
-2.80
-2.59
-2.46
-2.96
-2.88
-2.62
-2.58
-2.63
-3.45
-2.41
-2.44
-2.96
-2.84
-2.88
-2.26
-2.83
-3.64
-2.37
-3.25
-2.70
-2.55
-3.09

4
4
4
3
4
4
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
4
2
1
3
4
3
2
4
3
4
4
4

Note: The critical values for ZA test with a break in the intercept are -5.57 and -5.08 at the
1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. k denotes the number of lags in the regression
specification which is determined according to the AIC. *, ** and *** indicate that the null
hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance.
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Table 3 Cointegration Test Results With and Without a Structural Break
Engle-Granger Test
Gregory-Hansen Test
Locations
t-statistic
t-statistic
Break date
BRISBANE
Brisbane
Bundaberg
Caboolture
Caloundra
Charleville
Cunnamulla
Dalby
Gold Coast
Goondiwindi
Gympie
Hervey Bay
Ipswich
Kingaroy
Maryborough
North Coast
Roma
Toowoomba
Warwick
CAIRNS
Cairns
GLADSTONE
Emerald
Gladstone
Longreach
Rockhampton
MACKAY
Mackay
TOWNSVILLE
Charters Towers
Cloncurry
Mt. Isa
Townsville

k

5.30***
-2.46
-5.15***
-5.09***
-1.68
-1.72
-2.09
-5.27***
-1.61
-1.62
-1.91
-5.02***
-1.78
-2.30
-2.92
-1.79
-2.29
-1.93

-8.31***
-6.07***
-8.50***
-8.57***
-4.53
-4.73
-5.69**
-8.97***
-4.27
-5.40
-5.95**
-8.60***
-5.48
-5.17
-6.19***
-4.72
-5.55**
-7.08***

2008:06:11
2008:10:23
2008:02:07
2008:07:10
2008:07:06
2008:11:02
2008:06:14
2008:05:06
2008:07:10
2008:09:01
2008:05:15
2008:07:21
2008:10:21
2008:11:05
2008:04:03
2008:06:08
2008:04:02
2008:07:08

1
1
1
2
3
4
2
1
4
3
1
1
3
3
1
2
1
2

-1.89

-5.53**

2008:09:26

1

-1.74
-2.03
-1.73
-1.85

-4.85
-5.74**
-4.79
-5.09

2008:03:21
2008:11:11
2008:05:16
2008:11:04

2
2
2

-2.12

-4.85

2008:04:02

2

-2.22
-2.10
-2.59
-2.24

-5.62**
-5.02
-5.89
-5.89**

2008:10:30
2008:10:25
2008:10:25
2008:10:18

3
3
3
2

Note: All retailers are paired with the closest wholesaler, which is marked in bold. The critical values for the
EG test at the 1, 5 and 10% significance levels are -4.70,-4.14,-3.85 , respectively. The critical values for the
GH test at the 1, 5 and 10% significance levels are -6.45,-5.96,-5.72, respectively. The GH critical values are
asymptotic approximation calculated by Gregory and Hansen (1996b). k signifies the number of lags as
determined by the AIC. The locations marked in uppercase refer to the terminal locations.
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Table 4 The Cointegration Test Results Reported in Valadkhani (2013)
t-statistic t-statistic
ADF
EG
Locations
ADF
EG
Critical Value Critical Value
Brisbane Metro
Bundaberg
Caboolture
Caloundra
Cairns
Charters Towers
Cunnamulla
Dalby
Emerald
Gladstone
Gold Coast
Goondiwindi
Gympie
Hervey Bay
Ipswich
Kingaroy
Longreach
Mackay
Maryborough
Mt. Isa
North Coast
Rockhampton
Roma
Toowoomba
Warwick

-3.14**
-2.46
-2.83*
-2.34
-2.80*
-2.45
-3.79***
-3.21**
-2.88*
-2.24
-3.06**
-4.11***
-2.15
-2.43
-2.85*
-2.01
-2.74*
-4.02***
-1.96
-2.98**
-2.72*
-2.78*
-2.82*
-2.04
-3.37**

-3.14
-2.46
-2.83
-2.34
-2.80
-2.45
-3.79
-3.21
-2.88
-2.24
-3.06
-4.11*
-2.15
-2.43
-2.85
-2.01
-2.74
-4.02*
-1.96
-2.98
-2.72
-2.78
-2.82
-2.04
-3.37

-3.46 (1%)
-2.88 (5%)
-2.57 (10%)

-4.70 (1%)
-4.14 (5%)
-3.85 (10%)

Note: The t-statistic values and the ADF critical values are obtained from Table 3 of Valadkhani
(2013). The Engle and Granger (EG) critical values are obtained from Mackinnon (1991, Table 1)
corrected critical values for the case with two variables, a constant and a trend. *, ** and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5 Summary Statistics of Cointegration Regression Residuals
Retailer
location
Brisbane Metro

Terminal
location
Brisbane

Kurtosis
2.6593

Skewness
-0.6245

JarqueBera Test
164.737***

Bundaberg

Brisbane

2.6593

-0.6245

19.854***

Caboolture

Brisbane

2.6677

-0.5093

112.824***

Caloundra

Brisbane

2.9451

-0.6702

177.032***

Dalby

Brisbane

3.8495

0.0642

72.437***

Gold Coast

Brisbane

3.0695

-0.6935

189.707***

Hervey Bay

Brisbane

3.1912

-0.5449

120.131***

Ipswich

Brisbane

3.1255

-0.7804

241.016***

North Coast

Brisbane

3.3190

-0.5665

179.065***

Toowoomba

Brisbane

2.8760

0.2247

21.331***

Warwick

Brisbane

3.6371

-0.3538

88.952***

Cairns

3.7209

-0.0028

51.035***

Gladstone

Gladstone

3.8385

-0.6395

229.525***

Charters
Towers

Townsville

3.2558

-0.2705

35.136***

Townsville

Townsville

3.7343

-0.0471

53.783***

Cairns

Note: See note to Table 1.
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Table 6 Coefficient Estimates of the Threshold Error Correction Model with Student’s t Distribution

Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The parameter estimates correspond to the coefficient estimates in equations (2)
and (4). k denotes the lag length of the autoregressive terms which are the first difference of retail prices and the first difference of wholesale prices. ∗ denotes
the standardized threshold value which is obtained by dividing the threshold value

with its standard deviation.

equality in the speed of adjustment governing the price revision towards long-run equilibrium.
distribution.
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is the test for the null that there is

is the degree of freedom associated with the Student’s t

Table 7 Zivot-Andrews Test for Weekly Data
Wholesale
Locations
Brisbane
Cairns
Gladstone
Mackay
Townsville
Retail Locations
Brisbane
Bundaberg
Caboolture
Cairns
Caloundra
Charleville
Charters Towers
Cloncurry
Cunnamulla
Dalby
Emerald
Gladstone
Gold Coast
Goondiwindi
Gympie
Hervey Bay
Ipswich
Kingaroy
Longreach
Maryborough
Mackay
Mt Isa
North Coast
Rockhampton
Roma
Toowoomba
Townsville
Warwick

Break date

Test Statistic

k (lags)

2008:10:26
2008:10:26
2008:10:26
2008:10:26
2008:10:26

-8.25***
-8.23***
-8.29***
-8.27***
-8.19***

3
3
3
3
3

2008:10:26
2008:11:02
2008:10:26
2008:10:26
2008:10:26
2008:10:05
2008:10:05
2008:11:02
2008:11:02
2008:11:02
2008:11:02
2008:10:26
2008:11:02
2008:10:26
2008:11:02
2008:11:02
2008:11:02
2008:11:02
2008:10:26
2008:10:19
2008:11:02
2008:10:26
2008:10:26
2008:10:26
2008:10:26
2008:10:26
2008:10:19
2008:10:26

-6.13***
-6.57***
-6.16***
-7.49***
-5.83***
-6.68***
-6.68***
-6.30***
-5.92***
-7.71***
-7.42***
-7.44***
-6.14***
-6.48***
-6.11***
-6.79***
-5.97***
-6.68***
-7.29***
-7.08***
-6.72***
-6.67***
-6.41***
-7.36***
-7.11***
-7.27***
-6.50***
-6.75***

3
4
3
3
3
3
3
2
4
1
3
1
3
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
2
4
3
3
2
3
2
4

Note: The critical values for ZA test with a break in the intercept are -5.57 and -5.08 at
the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. k denotes the number of lags in the
regression specification which is determined according to the AIC. *, ** and ***
indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
of significance.
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Table 8 Results of Sensitivity Analyses
Panel A: Normal distribution
with a structural break
Retailer
location
Brisbane Metro
Bundaberg
Caboolture
Caloundra
Dalby
Gold Coast
Hervey Bay
Ipswich
North Coast
Toowoomba
Warwick
Cairns
Gladstone
Charters
Townsville

Terminal
location
Brisbane
Brisbane
Brisbane
Brisbane
Brisbane
Brisbane
Brisbane
Brisbane
Brisbane
Brisbane
Brisbane
Cairns
Gladstone
Townsville
Townsville

-0.0001
-0.0019**
0.0000
-0.0222***
-0.0070
-0.0351
-0.0123
-0.0144
-0.0281***
-0.0028
-0.7470***
-0.0027
-0.0015
-0.0065
-0.0024

-0.0002
-0.0022
-0.0005
-0.0139***
-0.0061
-0.0282
-0.0036
-0.0118
-0.0078*
-0.0026
-0.0011
-0.0009
-0.0057***
-0.0116*
-0.0082*

0.0804
11.0072***
6.1577**
16.7631***
7.8746***
3.0075*
21.5329***
2.4068
13.9388***
0.1112
7.8879***
10.0408***
7.9323***
7.8746***
12.7471***

Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
speed of adjustment governing the price revision towards long-run equilibrium.
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Panel B: Daily data
without a structural break

-0.0060***
-0.0003***
-0.0253***
-0.0103***
-0.0018
-0.0100***
-0.0047***
-0.0122***
-0.0053***
-0.0012***
-0.0018***
0.0000
-0.0040***
-0.0011***
-0.0034***

-0.0040***
-0.0003***
-0.0136***
-0.0022
-0.0027**
-0.0051***
-0.0061***
-0.0062***
-0.0029***
-0.0027***
0.0002
-0.0005**
-0.0030***
-0.0012
-0.0026***

4.3115*
9.3840***
0.0013
17.0262***
12.2815***
11.5490***
6.6151*
17.4379***
4.4507*
17.5223***
12.4601***
7.0024***
1.9260
0.3983
6.5285*

is the test for the null that there is equality in the
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